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                            1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sixty-five per cent of the Finnish wood-producing forests are owned by 
private persons. To these owners the public sector gives, since the 
1960s, aid, the purpose of which is to increase the long-term cutting 
potential of the forests. Especially subsidized are artificial 
regeneration, draining, fertilizing and forest roads building (see Linden 
and Leppänen (2004)) The size of this aid is considerable. For 
example, in financing of silvicultural and forest improvement works in 
private forests, the public subsidy was in the 1990s between 50 to 70 
per cent of the private outlays (see METLA (2003)). 
 
 
This paper analyzes forestry subsidies. I differentiate between 
investment and production subsidies. In practice, three types of 
forestry investments are distinguished. First, there is reforesting bare 
lands like cornfields. For northern tree types the growing period is 
more than thirty (maybe one hundred) years. On the other hand, with 
other tree types like eucalyptus in South- American countries the 
situation is different. One can (and does) speak about tree- fields and 
the investing means creating new tree- fields. Second, there are 
improvement works of existing forests like draining, forest road 
building etc. The characteristic feature of these two types is that they 
may be considered permanent. I mean these when I speak about 
forest investments and the expression “increase in effective forest 
reserves” is intended to cover both an increase in area and in quality 
of forests. Third, many times in (Nordic) literature the costs of 
replanting the cut areas are included in investments. This may be 
defended by the long maturity period. Theoretically, as will be 
discussed below, a continuous replanting is considered optimal. In 
addition, replanting is often mandatory, for example, because of 
environmental reasons. With tree types with a considerably shorter 
maturity replanting may be characterized as sowing on existing tree 
fields. I include these costs in production costs. Into production costs I 
also include, naturally, cutting trees and transporting them. 
 
 
In Finland, the main demand for wood comes from a few large firms 
producing paper products There are accusations about their collusion 
in buying wood. On the other hand, private Finnish forest owners are 
well-organized via their associations. Recently, paper industry has 
accused forest owners for collusion in wood selling (see HS (2008)). All 
this seems to imply a non-competitive wood market. There are, 
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however, factors pointing to a more competitive situation. About one-
third of Finnish wood consumption is imported from Russia at 
competitive prices. At first sight, it would seem that this implies lower 
(and more competitive) wood prices to Finnish forest owners. This is 
not necessarily so. A considerable part of these imports consist of such 
wood (birch etc.) which does not grow plentifully in Finland but is 
needed as a component part in the optimal mixture for producing final 
goods like paper. In this way, these imports can lead to increased 
demand for ordinary Finnish wood like spruce and pine and to an 
increase in their price and strengthen a potential monopoly position of 
Finnish forest-owners. 
 
 
 
I have modeled wood markets as follows. The wood buyers, that is, 
the producers of final goods based on wood, are competitive. The 
wood sellers (the forest owners) are modeled in two ways. In a 
competitive situation wood prices are exogenous to forest owners 
while in a non-competitive situation these owners take into account 
the effect of their supply on wood price. This I have formulated in a 
rather general way. 
 
 
 
For the analysis we first need a description of the output of forest 
reserves. A venerable model is Faustmann  (1849). It is still 
considered to be theoretically valid (see, e.g., Samuelson (1976)). It is 
a profit maximization model where harvesting is related to stands with 
different ages and there is replanting. Based on this, Mitra and Wan 
(1985) showed that the following (stationary) forest is optimal: A 
forest is split into M equal subplots each containing trees of age a (a = 
0,1,...,M-1). In each period, trees of age M are cut down and the 
subplot so cleared is planted with seedlings (age zero trees.) I will 
apply a continuous-time modification of this and analyze a situation 
where there are subplots of every age on a continuous time scale and 
cutting (and replanting) takes place continuously. I will assume that 
investments contribute instantaneously to larger production of wood. 
This simplifies the analysis considerably. 
 
 
 
In forestry investments there are obvious congestion phenomena. 
When foresting new areas, the best sites are taken into cultivation first 
and less productive sites later on. Or the most effective roads are built 
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first. I model this as installment costs which grow with the cumulative 
investments. These investments lead to an increase in the effective 
size of forests which I will call reserves. Other outlays like cutting and 
transporting wood or planting in the cut areas, are included in variable 
costs. Two types of subsidies are discussed. The first is investment 
subsidy. By it I mean support to outlays which increase reserves. The 
second is production subsidy which reduces variable costs of forest 
owner. When comparing permanent subsidies, it turns out that their 
consequences are surprisingly similar. However, if subsidies are 
temporary, their effects may differ rather much. 
 
 
I apply a dynamic Ramsey-type model. It has similarities to those 
presented, e.g., by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch.2.4.) or Sen and 
Turnovsky  (1991). In their models transitional dynamics is generated 
by increasing investment installation costs in competitive 
circumstances with decreasing returns to scale technology. These 
installation costs increase when the size of investment flow increases. 
Without this there are no transitional dynamics. In my model, there 
are constant returns to scale and no such installation costs. In a 
competitive situation a subsidy leads to an instantaneous jump to a 
new steady state value. That there are installment costs which depend 
on cumulative investments does not change this. Surprisingly, it turns 
out that non-competitiveness among wood sellers is sufficient to 
generate transitional dynamics.  
 
 
Finance markets are assumed fully functioning. The forest-owner can 
lend and borrow at a given interest rate which is equal to her personal 
time preference rate. This contrasts with forestry models with various 
types of finance markets imperfections. For example, Tahvonen et al. 
(2001) and Brazee (2003) discuss, among other things, situations 
where forest owners pay higher interest rate as borrowers than as 
lenders. This leads to a so called Volvo- effect where consumption 
decisions determine harvesting time. Finally, Tahvonen and Salo 
(1999) discuss optimal forest rotation in a modified Ramsey- model 
with perfect capital markets. The modification concerns including the 
forest reserves in utility function as bequests. For utility, I will apply a 
conventional formulation. 
 
 
Abel (1982) showed that temporary investment subsidy is, in the short 
run, more expansionary than a permanent subsidy because the 
investor tries to have the subsidy benefit as long as it lasts in spite of 
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higher installment costs. Similar results were obtained by Sen and 
Turnovsky (1990) within an open-economy framework.  This probably 
applies in my model also if there is transitional dynamics. On the other 
hand, as I show, a temporary production subsidy is less expansionary 
than a permanent one. Even a temporary production subsidy leads 
larger reserves but when considering their yield one has to take into 
consideration that the variable production costs increase after the 
subsidy stops.  
 
 
The model is presented in Section 2 which discusses forest owners’ 
optimization and the ensuing first order conditions for the two types of 
permanent subsidies in a competitive and non-competitive situations. 
Long run effects are presented in Section 3 and transitional dynamics 
in Section 4. Forest owners' indebtedness and wealth are discussed in 
Section 5. Section 6 deals with temporary subsidies and compares 
their effects with those of permanent subsidies. Concluding remarks 
are in Section 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                      2. THE MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
Wood is produced in forests owned by a representative consumer - 
forest owner - wood producer. The effective size of these forests is 
denoted by R which I will call (forest) reserves. These reserves contain 
different age groups of trees and are cut and replanted at a constant 
rate σ. Accordingly, there is a continuous flow of wood σR(t) where t 
denotes time. Variable unit costs (going to outsiders) of, for example, 
cutting and transporting wood are assumed constant. Without affecting 
the conclusions we can set them equal to zero. Investments, I, 
increase reserves and they are financed by borrowing and/or from 
retained earnings. There is no depreciation of reserves because all cut 
areas are replanted. Installation costs of investments increase with the 
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size of R. A simple formulation for this is to assume that the total costs 
of investing I is (1+h(R))I, h' > 0. The forest owner maximizes her 
intertemporal utility depending on her consumption c subject to the 
(flow) budget constraint. She may take loans from a fully functioning 
credit market at a constant interest rate i* and her subjective discount 
rate is equal to this. Her indebtedness at time t is B(t). For forest 
investments she may obtain an investment subsidy z measured as a 
share of the overall investment costs. Correspondingly, she may obtain 
unit production subsidy, s, for producing wood. All in all, her 
optimization may be presented as 
 
 
                         ∞                     
                 max ∫u(c(t))e- i*tdt                                      (1) 
                       0                       
 
subject to 
 
                  dB/dt=   i*B + c + (1-z)(1+h(R))I - wσR  - sσR    (2a) 
 
                  dR/dt = I                                                 (2b) 
 
 
where u denotes instantaneous utility, u’> 0, u’’< 0, and w denotes 
wood price. Wood market equilibrium may be presented as w = f(σR) 
= w(R). In the competitive situation wood price is exogenous to the 
forest owner, that is, w' = 0. In the non-competitive situation w' < 0, 
w'' < 0. An increase in a forest owner's wood supply leads to a 
decrease in its price. 
 
 
For forest owner’s optimization, the Hamiltonian is: 
 
                                                                                      
      H =  {u(c)- µ[ i*B+c+(1-z)(1+h(R))I–sσR-wσR]+µqI} e
-i*t   
(3)
     
 
     
The control variables are c and I while B and R are state variables. The 
co- state variables are  - µ(t)e
-i*t
 for  debt accumulation and  
µ(t)q(t)e
-i*t 
 for reserve accumulation. The first degree optimum 
conditions are: 
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       u’(c(t)) = µ(t)                (from dH/dc = 0)         (4a) 
 
      (1-z)(1+h(R)) = q           (from dH/dI = 0 )        (4b) 
 
      d(-µe
-i*t
)/dt =  µi*e
-i*t
                                      (4c) 
  
      d [µqe
-i*t 
] /dt   = µ[ -wσ - w'σR - sσ + (1-z) h'(R)I ] e
-i*t  
 (4d) 
 
 
Additionally, there are transversality conditions which may be shown 
to be fulfilled.  
 
 
From Eq. (4c), dµ/dt = 0 or µ is constant. Because the utility function, 
u, is decreasingly increasing, we may conclude from Eq. (4a) that 
consumption is the same for all t, that is, there is a complete 
consumption smoothing. Accordingly, from Eqs. (2a) and (2b)  
 
 
 
            c(t) = c* = (w*+s)σR* - i*B*                                         (5) 
 
 
 
where asterisks refer to long run (steady state) values. Differentiating 
Eq. (4b) with respect to q we may see that Rq > 0 and from this that 
Iq > 0. Using dµ/dt = 0 and Eq. (4c) we obtain from Eq. (4d): 
 
 
           dq/dt = i*q  - wσ - w'σR  - sσ 
 
+ (1-z)h’(R)I         (6) 
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          3. LONG RUN EFFECTS 
 
 
 
Eqs. (6) and (4b) yield in the steady state, 
 
 
     i*q*  =   w*σ + w'(R*)σR* +
 
sσ
 
  = i*(1-z)(1+h(R*))              (7) 
 
 
From Eq. (7) we may see that the steady state value of q, the shadow 
price of resources, is equal to cost of the last unit of new reserves, 
that is, q* = (1-z)(1 + h(R*). The competitive case is obtained by 
setting w' = 0 in Eq. (7): 
 
 
      i*q*  =   wσ  +  sσ 
 
= i*(1-z)(1+h(R*))                        (7') 
 
 
Eq. (7') shows that the interest cost of the last additional unit of forest 
is equal to the revenue obtained from it. Notice that the same 
condition would be obtained by choosing resources so that the 
discounted net profits would be maximized, that is, from maximizing 
the following net profit with respect to R*: 
 
 
               ∞                                       R* 
             ∫(w+s)sR* e-i*t dt    -      ∫ (1-z)(1 + h(R))dR             
             0                                        R0         
 
 
where the last term above presents the costs of the instantaneous 
increase in reserves by R* - R0. Comparing Eq. (7') with Eq. (7) we 
see that with imperfect competition optimal long-run resources are 
smaller than in the competitive case. Differentiating Eq. (7) we obtain 
 
 
∂R*/∂z= [i*(1+h(R*))] / [i*(1-z)h'(R*)-2w'(R*)σ - w''(R*)σR*]   (8a) 
 
 
∂R*/∂s =   σ / [i*(1-z)h'(R*) - 2w'(R*)σ - w''(R*)σR*]      (8b) 
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which are positive because w',w'' ≤ 0 and h' > 0. Both types of 
subsidies lead to larger steady state reserves both in the non-
competitive and competitive case. 
 
 
 
 
              4. SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
 
 
 
The system may be seen as functions of two variables, R and q.  
Linearizing the non-linear functions in Equations (2b) and (6) around 
the steady state values, denoted by asterisks, yields 
 
 
  dR/dt  = Iq(q*)(q-q*)                                    (9a) 
 
 
  dq/dt   =  i*q - sσ - w*σ - w'(R*)σR*- [2w'(R*)σ+ w''(R*)σR*][R-R*]      
                                                                
                   +(1-z)Iq(q*)h'(R*)[q-q*]                     (9b)  
                     
 
These equations may be presented in matrix form as:                  
 
 
 
     dR/dt                0        Iq(q*)        R             constant 
   |           |    =  |                      |   |       | +   |               |        (10)  
     dq/dt                E         G              q              constant 
 
 
 
where E = - [2w'(R*)σ + w''(R*)σR*] > 0 and G = i* + (1-z)Iqh'(R*) 
> 0. When solving these two simultaneous differential equations, one 
of the characteristic roots is negative, equal to  
v = [G-(G
2+4IqE)
1/2
]/2, and the other is positive, equal to  
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[G+(G
2
+4IqE)
1/2
]/2. Consequently, we have saddle-path dynamics. 
Notice that in the competitive situation E = 0 which implies that the 
stable root v is zero and, accordingly, that there are no transitional 
dynamics. Reserves jump instantaneously to the steady state level. 
 
  
The optimal path is the stable branch of the saddle-paths. A particular 
solution of these simultaneous differential equations is, applying Eq. 
(7) in Eq. (9b), q(t) = q* , R(t) = R*  and so we obtain the time path 
of R as: 
 
 
           R(t) = R* + (R0 - R*)e
vt
                                     (11) 
 
 
where R0  is the initial reserves.  Eq. (11) shows the gradual growth of 
reserves to their new steady state size as a consequence of subsidy. 
As Eq. (3) shows, the wood price starts falling according to the 
increase in forest reserves. Differentiating Eq. (11) and inserting it into 
Eq. (9a) yields the corresponding optimal path for q: 
 
 
  q(t) =  q* + (v/Iq)(R0 - R*)e
vt
  = q* + (v/Iq)(R(t) - R*)  (12) 
 
 
 
A conclusion from Eq. 12) is that in the competitive case the shadow 
price of resources q adjusts instantaneously to its steady state level. 
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                 5. DEBT AND WEALTH 
 
 
 
 
Using Eqs. (4b), (5), (7), (11) and (12) in Eq. (2a) and linearizing  we 
obtain the following first-order differential equation for indebtedness 
(see Appendix): 
 
       dB/dt  = i*B - i*B*  +  (q*v - i*q*)(R0 - R*)e
vt 
  (13) 
 
 
Solving this yields   
 
        B(t) = B*  +  Ω [ R0 – R*] e
vt
 = B*  +  Ω [ R(t) – R*]   (14) 
 
 
where Ω  = q* = 1+h(R*) >  1 and B* is the steady state 
indebtedness. We may see from Eq. (14) that the forest owner's debt 
increases in the same way as the reserves increase. Further, from Eq. 
(14),  
 
 
          ∂B*/∂z = Ω [∂R*/∂z]                                        (15a) 
 
          ∂B*/∂s = Ω [∂R*/∂s]                                        (15b) 
      
 
As may be seen, the long-run indebtedness of the forest owner 
increases as a consequence of both types of subsidies. Applying this in 
Eq. (14) and using Eq. (11) we may infer that debt increases along its 
time path in the non-competitive case. The competitive case is 
straightforward: reserves increase instantaneously to the long-run 
level. As is obvious this is entirely financed by increased debt.   
 
 
From Eq. (14), B* - B(0)  = Ω [ R* – R0] where Ω > 1. This should not 
be interpreted so that the wealth of the forest-owner decreases in the 
long run as a consequence of subsidies. Instead, we should compare 
debt with the value of reserves. This value V is the present 
(discounted) value of sales revenues at time 0 or 
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                     ∞                     
          V   =   ∫ (w(t) + s)σR(t)e -i*tdt                                      (16) 
                     0                       
 
 
As an example let us analyze the competitive case. As discussed 
above, subsidies (or an increase in subsidies) lead to an instantaneous 
increase in reserves, let us say from R1* to R2*. Assume for simplicity 
that there are no subsidies in the initial situation which is denoted by 
subscript 1.  The (post-subsidy) value of reserves R2* at wood price w  
is, from (16) applying Eq. (7'), 
  
 
                       ∞                     
          V2   =   ∫ (w+s)σR2*e -i*tdt                                   
                     0     
 
                  =  (w+s)σR2*/i*  =  (1-z)(1+h(R2*))R2*                 
 
 
Correspondingly, the value of reserves R1* at price w is 
 
 
                       ∞                     
          V1   =   ∫ wσR1*e -i*tdt    = wσR1*/i*  =  (1+h(R1*))R1*                                              
                     0     
 
As may be shown t 
he cost of the instantaneous reserves increase from R1* to R2* is 
 
 
                         R2* 
         C    =   ∫ (1-z)(1 + h(R))dR    = (1-z)(1+h(ξ))(R2*- R1*)                  
                       R1* 
 
 
where R1* < ξ  <  R2*. Because there is no transitional dynamics this 
is equal to the (instantaneous) debt increase B2* - B1*. The increase 
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in income flow, (w+s)σR2* - wσR1*, is used for the increase in interest 
payments and in consumption. Let us analyze the two types of subsidy 
separately. If there is production subsidy in state 2, the (potential) 
increase in net wealth, V2 - V1 - C, is 
 
 
        (1+h(R2*))R2* - (1+h(R1*))R1* = (1+h(ξ))(R2* - R1*) 
 
         = [h(R2*) - h(ξ)] R2* + [(h(ξ) - h(R1*)]R1*    
 
 
This is positive because h is an increasing function and R1* < ξ  <  
R2*. Production subsidy increases the forest owner's net wealth.  
 
 
 
For investment subsidy, the increase in net wealth may be presented 
as 
 
 
      wσR2*/i* - wσR1*/i* - (1-z)(1+h(ξ))(R2*- R1*) 
 
      = (wσ/i*)(R2*- R1*) - (1-z)(1+h(ξ))(R2*- R1*) 
 
       = (1-z)(1+h(R2*))(R2*- R1*) - (1-z)(1+h(ξ))(R2*- R1*) 
 
       = (1-z) [h(R2*) - h(ξ)](R2*- R1*) 
 
 
This is positive because ξ  <  R2. Investment subsidy increases the 
forest-owner's net wealth. 
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                6. TEMPORARY SUBSIDIES  
 
 
 
In the competitive situation, the forest-owner obviously reaches 
highest welfare by maximizing her discounted net profits because 
there is no transitional dynamics of reserves (cf. the discussion in 
Section 3). Assume that production subsidy is paid from time 0 to time 
T. The forest-owner chooses the reserves R* so that the following is 
maximized: 
 
 
               T                                    ∞ 
              ∫ [wσR*+sσR*] e-i*tdt + ∫ wσR*e-i*tdt 
             0                                    T 
                                                 
           R*                                                                (17) 
                - (1-z)∫ (1+h(R))dR 
         R0 
 
where R0 is the initial level of reserves and R* denotes their post-
subsidy steady-state levels. The first order condition is 
 
 
             wσ  +  (1 – e
-i*T
)sσ   = (1-z) i*(1+ h(R*))             (18) 
 
 
 
Because h is an increasing function of R, Eq. (18) shows that a 
temporary production subsidy leads to an increase in reserves which is 
smaller than with permanent subsidy. Eq. (18) may be interpreted so 
that the average income from selling one unit of wood must equal the 
interest cost of the last unit invested and this average income is 
smaller with temporary subsidy. When the owner invests she has to 
take into account that her costs increase after time T. As is obvious for 
investment subsidy, temporariness does not affect the results at all. 
 
 
 
How about temporary subsidies in the non-competitive situation? 
There are now transitional dynamics caused by falling price. Referring 
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to Abel (1982) we may expect that temporary forest investment 
subsidy speeds up the increase in investment as compared with 
permanent subsidy as long as the marginal benefit from subsidy more 
than offsets the fall in wood price. The long run effect is smaller 
reserves than with permanent subsidy because a larger short-run 
investment leads to an earlier price fall.  Opposite to this, for 
production subsidy the increase in investments is smaller for 
temporary subsidy than for permanent one. After all, so this is the 
case if wood price does not fall. To show the effects of temporary 
subsidies rigorously is complicated and I leave it at these remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        7. CONCLUSIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
Both an investment subsidy and a production subsidy lead to an 
increase in forest reserves and wood production. All or a part of this is 
financed by increased indebtedness. The forest- owners' net wealth, 
consumption and welfare increase. For production subsidy, these 
increases are smaller for a temporary subsidy than for a permanent 
subsidy. For investment subsidy the increases are either equal or 
larger for a temporary subsidy. Transitional dynamics is created by 
non-competitiveness and the long run reserves are smaller (for a 
further analysis, see Tolonen (2008)). Assume now that the 
representative agent represents one among a large group of (identical) 
consumer- owners and her personal wood supply does not affect wood 
price even if all agents' combined supply does. Obviously here 
investment subsidies lead to too large and too rapid investments (from 
the forest owners' point of view). 
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APPENDIX  
 
SEC. 2. Transversality conditions are fulfilled 
 
 
Optimality requires the following transversality conditions: 
 
              lim H = 0  
              t→∞ 
           
              lim -µe
-i*t
 = 0  
              t→∞ 
           
              lim µq e
- i*t
 = 0  
            t→∞ 
 
H = { u(c)- µ [ i*B + c + (1-z)(1+h(R))I – sσR - w(R)σR ]+µqI } e
-i*t          
 
 
Because µ and c are constant and I* = 0, the conditions are fulfilled if  
 
              
 
              lim Re
- i*t
 = 0 
              t→∞ 
           
              lim B e
- i*t
 = 0  
              t→∞ 
           
              lim q e
- i*t
 = 0  
              t→∞ 
  
 
Because R*, B* and q* are finite the conditions are fulfilled. 
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SEC. 2 AND 4: 
 
 
From Eq. (4c) 
 
          d(-µe
-i*t
)/dt = [d(-µ)/dt] e
-i*t
 +  µi*e
i*t
  = - (∂H/∂B) = µi*e
i*t
    
             
 
From this, dµ/dt = 0. Applying this, the fourth condition becomes 
 
   d [µqe
-i*t 
] /dt   = µe
-i*t
 (dq/dt) +  q d(µe
-i*t
)/dt   
 
           = µe
-i*t
 (dq/dt) -  qi*µe
-i*t
     =  - (∂H/∂R) ) 
 
           = µ [- wσ  - w'σR - sσ + (1-z)h'(R)I]e
-i*t 
 
 
Dividing by µe
-i*t 
yields  
 
     dq/dt = i*q  - wσ  - w'σR  - sσ
 
 + (1-z)h'(R)I  
 
 
Linearizing, 
 
      dq/dt   =  i*q  -  w*σ  - w'(R*)σR*  
 
    =  
 
- [2w'(R*)σ + w''(R*)σR*][R-R*] + (1-z)Iq(q*)h'(R*)[q-q*] 
 
           +(1-z) I* h’(R*) + (1-z)Iq(q*)h'(R*) [q-q*]  
 
            +  (1-z)I*h''(R*)[R-R*]   -  sσ 
 
 
Because I* = 0 these are as presented in text.Linearizing Eq. (2b) 
yields 
 
         dR/dt =   I(q*) + Iq(q-q*) = Iq(q*)(q-q*)  
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SEC.5. Foreign debt 
 
 
dB/dt  =  c  + i*B  -  wσR +   (1+h(R))I   (use Eq. (5)) 
 
=  w*σ R*- i*B*+sσR* + i*B - wσR - sσR + (1-z) (1+h(R))I  
 
(use Eq.(4b)) 
 
= i*B - i*B* + (w*+s)σR* -  (w+s)σR    + qI (linearize) 
 
=   i*B - i*B* + (w*+s)σR* - (w*+s)σR*  
 
        -  [w*σ + w'(R*)σR*+sσ](R(t) – R*)  
 
       + q*Iq (q-q*) (use Eq. (11) and Eq. (12)) 
 
=  i*B - i*B*  -  [w*σ + w'(R*)σR*+ sσ](R0 - R*)e
vt 
   
 
        +  q*v (R0 - R*)e
vt 
 
 
 = i*B - i*B* - i*q*(R0 - R*)e
vt 
+ q*v (R0 - R*)e
vt 
 (when using (7)) 
 
Solving this first-degree differential equation yields 
 
B(t) = Me
i*t
+ e
i*t ∫[ – i*B*] e-i*t dt 
 
       + e
i*t ∫[- i*q*   + q*v][R0 – R*] e-i*t + vt dt 
 
   =    Me
i*t
 + B* + [-i*q* 
 
+ q*v][1/(v – i*)]
 
[ R0 – R*] e
vt
 
  
=    Me
i*t
   + B* + Ω[ R0 – R*] e
vt 
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where, using Eq. (7),  Ω  = q* = 1+h(R*).   To obtain M set t = 0: M 
= B(0) – B* - Ω [R0 – R*]. Inserting this into the equation above and 
dividing by e
i*t
 yields 
 
B(t)e
–i*t
 = B(0) – B* 
 
 - Ω [R0 – R*] 
 
                 +  B* e
-i*t
 + Ω [R0 – R*] e
vt-i*t 
 
Letting t approach infinity and applying the transversality conditions 
yields 
 
          0
 
= B(0) – B* - Ω[ R0 – R*]  = M 
 
Inserting this into the solution of the first order differential equation 
yields 
 
            B(t) = B*  +  Ω[ R0 – R*] e
vt
 .  
 
 
 
 
Overall investment cost: 
 
 
Costs of investing R* – R are 
 
(Rs – Rs-1)(1+hs) + (Rs-1 – Rs-2)(1+hs-1) + ….. 
 
 
Letting the division approach zero this is 
 
 
 R* 
∫ (1 + h(R))dR = (1+h(ξ))(R*-R0), R0 < ξ < R* 
R0 
 
 
by intermediate theorem of integral calculus. 
